[PDF.92ph] Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations

Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations

[PDF.rt99] Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations

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 | #228103 in Books |  Harvard University Press |  2005-03-15 |  2005-02-14 | Original language:English | PDF # 1 |  8.94 x.94 x5.69l,1.13 | File type: PDF | 400 pages

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||2 of 2 people found the following review helpful.| Essential reading|By Ed Cox|Peter Feaver's book offers a new perspective on civil-military relations from Huntington's classic model. Using agency theory, Feaver seeks to explain how civilians can and should maintain control of the military. As a professor who teaches civil-military relations, I find his work very useful in explaining concepts in the classroom.

Ed

How do civilians control the military? In the wake of September 11, the renewed presence of national security in everyday life has made this question all the more pressing. In this book, Peter Feaver proposes an ambitious new theory that treats civil-military relations as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive monitoring the actions of military agents, the "armed servants" of the nation-state. Military obedience is not automatic but depends on str...

You easily download any file type for your gadget.Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations   |  Peter D. Feaver. Which are the reasons I like to read books. Great story by a great author.

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